Prospects for Peace and Democracy: Power-Sharing in Sub-Saharan Africa by Burgess, Michael
Res Publica - Journal of Undergraduate Research
Volume 16 | Issue 1 Article 11
2011
Prospects for Peace and Democracy: Power-
Sharing in Sub-Saharan Africa
Michael Burgess
Illinois Wesleyan University
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Ames Library, the Andrew W. Mellon Center for Curricular and Faculty
Development, the Office of the Provost and the Office of the President. It has been accepted for inclusion in Digital Commons @ IWU by
the faculty at Illinois Wesleyan University. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@iwu.edu.
©Copyright is owned by the author of this document.
Recommended Citation
Burgess, Michael (2011) "Prospects for Peace and Democracy: Power-Sharing in Sub-
Saharan Africa," Res Publica - Journal of Undergraduate Research: Vol. 16
Available at: http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/respublica/vol16/iss1/11
Prospects for Peace and Democracy: Power-Sharing in Sub-Saharan Africa
Abstract
Sub-Saharan Africa is one of the most politically unstable and undemocratic regions in the world. Theories of
power-sharing and recent studies have indicated that institutions that allow for higher levels of power-sharing
are often more successful at consolidating democracy and stability in highly divided societies, like those
common in Sub-Saharan Africa. By examining the electoral system, executive type, and level of
decentralization, this study first determines the level of institutional power-sharing for each of the 48 Sub-
Saharan states. Next, it compares these levels of power-sharing to indicators of democracy and state stability to
determine if more power-sharing does correspond to greater democracy and stability. Using a bivariate
analysis and factoring in region, the data shows that there is a strong and significant correlation between
higher levels of institutional power-sharing and higher levels of democracy and state stability in Sub-Saharan
Africa.
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Abstract: Sub-Saharan Africa is one of the most politically unstable and undemocratic regions in the 
world. Theories of power-sharing and recent studies have indicated that institutions that allow for higher 
levels of power-sharing are often more successful at consolidating democracy and stability in highly 
divided societies, like those common in Sub-Saharan Africa. By examining the electoral system, executive 
type, and level of decentralization, this study first determines the level of institutional power-sharing for 
each of the 48 Sub-Saharan states. Next, it compares these levels of power-sharing to indicators of 
democracy and state stability to determine if more power-sharing does correspond to greater democracy 
and stability. Using a bivariate analysis and factoring in region, the data shows that there is a strong and 
significant correlation between higher levels of institutional power-sharing and higher levels of democracy 
and state stability in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Sub-Saharan region of Africa is arguably one of the most divided and conflict-prone 
regions in the world. The region is home to more than a thousand languages, and in the past 
twenty years most Sub-Saharan countries have experienced violence ranging from ethnic 
rebellions to genocide.! The chronic instability and deep cleavages of the states in this region 
present comparative political scientists and institution crafters with a unique challenge: how to 
implement a democratic system that is truly representative and stable. This challenge is 
heightened by the question of how to set up a system that is not susceptible to failure and gives 
all parties involved an incentive to see it succeed. Power-sharing, it is theorized, can provide 
solutions to both of these problems. The ability for power-sharing institutions to include all 
major parties in the decision-making process would appear to make them ideal candidates for 
alleviating the tensions that exist between competing groups in Sub-Saharan states. For the 
aforementioned reasons, power-sharing institutions are considered especially relevant not just 
to the divided societies of Africa, but those across the globe. 
Sub-Saharan Africa provides a hard test for determining how effective power-sharing 
institutions can be in states that are often extremely divided and have experienced violence 
relatively recently. Disputed elections have produced violence, and tension between ethnic 
groups has often resulted in conflict, exemplified most shockingly by Rwanda. The resurgence 
of violence is often a concern to both policy makers within these states and the international 
community, as violence in one state can destabilize the surrounding region. Successful power­
sharing is theorized to prevent the outbreak of violence by bringing all major stakeholders to 
the table. Evidence of this can be found in Burundi, where in 2009 the last rebel group, the 
National Liberation Forces, laid down their arms and were recognized as a legal political party.2 
1 Oppong 2006; Global Report 2009. 
2 Freedom House 2010: Burundi. 
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Such instances seem to provide evidence that power-sharing can promote peace and 
successfully integrate opposing groups into the political process. However, power-sharing is 
not without its critics. The formal recognition of ethnic or linguistic groups may only serve to 
institutionalize differences and exacerbate existing tensions. Granting groups considerable 
levels of autonomy may only serve to weaken the state, as it can potentially lead to secession as 
in the case of Southern Sudan. Because of the controversial nature of power-sharing institutions, 
both its proponents and critics must be considered. 
This study will approach the topic of power-sharing first by taking a step back to 
consider the arguments and evidence of supporters and detractors of power-sharing 
institutions. The purpose of this study is not to consider why states adopt power-sharing 
institutions. Instead, it is to examine whether those Sub-Saharan states that have adopted 
institutions allowing for higher levels of power-sharing have experienced higher levels of 
democracy and stability. This study seeks to answer that question by comparing the 
institutional levels of power-sharing in Sub-Saharan states to their measured levels of 
democracy and stability. While power-sharing institutions are often cited as solutions for 
mitigating conflict and consolidating democracy in cleaved states, surprisingly enough, their 
influence as yet has not been tested in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
THE CASES FOR AND AGAINST POWER-SHARING 
The importance of determining whether or not power-sharing institutions improve 
democracy and reduce conflict cannot be overstated. Establishing systematic evidence to 
evaluate the impact of power-sharing institutions is both theoretically and politically important 
for determining if these arrangements promote long-term peace, manage conflict, and 
consolidate democracy in ethnically divided societies. There exists an extensive literature 
dedicated to these very issues, which has been developed over the past several decades. This 
paper draws substantially from the seminal work by Pippa Norris in 2008 in which the theories 
of power-sharing are tested in a large number of cases across the globe. These power-sharing 
regimes are characterized by formal institutional rules that give multiple political elites a stake 
in the decision making process.3 Power-sharing constitutions share common characteristics that 
include the following: executive power-sharing among a grand coalition of political leaders 
drawn from all significant groups, proportional representation of major groups in elected and 
appointed offices, and cultural autonomy for groups. 
It is argued that in post-conflict or ethnically cleaved states the only viable types of 
settlements capable of attracting agreement from all factions are power-sharing regimes that 
avoid winner-takes-all electoral outcomes. The more inclusive these power-sharing 
arrangements are the more likely they will develop stronger support from stakeholders and 
therefore ensure stability. While other methods of resolving conflict in ethnically divided 
societies have been attempted in the past, such as partition, these are often costly and end in 
3 Norris 2008, 22. 
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failure.4 Street indicates that power-sharing addresses the key issues that have caused ethnic 
tension and hostility, and thus is ideal as a remedy to such problems. Institutions that allow for 
the horizontal and vertical dispersal of power are most relevant to heterogeneous societies that 
have a history of conflict and are in the process of democratizing. In Africa there is a tendency 
for elites to concentrate power at the center and use repressive means as a way of asserting 
controLS Avoiding such circumstances is necessary if there is to be any substantial consolidation 
of democracy. The use of power-sharing in these segmented societies guarantees all significant 
stakeholders a place in the national or regional governments and provides a strong incentive 
for politicians to accept the legitimacy of the rules of game, moderate their views, and 
collaborate with rivals. Norris suggests that power-sharing institutions also encourage support 
for democracy by avoiding winner-take-all elections and guaranteeing minorities a voice in the 
government. With assurances that they will not be excluded from government, minorities are 
also less likely to take actions that might undermine the stability of the state. 
While power-sharing institutions are often cited as being the best option for highly 
divided societies, there are still those who challenge the claims that power-sharing institutions 
are best for promoting democracy and mitigating conflict. Power-sharing regimes may in fact 
serve to institutionalize ethnic cleavages and deepen rather than alleviate them. Explicitly 
recognizing the rights of ethnic groups can make it more difficult to generate cross-cutting 
cooperation in society by reducing electoral incentive for compromise. The formal recognition 
of ethnic or linguistic groups may magnify the political importance of these identities. Solutions 
to ethnic conflict that take pre-democratic factions as fixed and grant each group rights and 
autonomy may in fact reinforce sub-national identities. By de-emphasizing such identities it 
may be possible to turn citizens towards a concept of society that is more inclusive and tolerant 
of other groupS.6 
In addition to reinforcing societal divisions, Spears argues that power-sharing 
institutions lead to a surprisingly unstable form of government that at best only provides a 
short reprieve from violent conflicU Power-sharing arrangements are difficult to achieve and 
even more difficult to put into practice, and do not stand the test of time or resolve conflict. At 
the same time power-sharing regimes in post-conflict societies have an extremely difficult task 
ahead of them; they must bridge the cleavages of groups in conflict.s Power-sharing is not about 
forming a grand coalition of friends, but reconciling groups that are enemies. Including warring 
parties and excluding moderates can have negative consequences for divided societies using 
power-sharing.9 Using Rwanda as an example, Spears suggests that it is as difficult to forge an 
alliance with a member of the opposition as it is to form an alliance with someone who is 
4 Street 2004. 
5 Bratton and Rothchild 1992. 
6 Norris 2008, 28. 
7 Spears 2002. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Jarstad 2006. 
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considered a murderer. For many of these ethnically divided or post-conflict societies, power­
sharing can be equated to making a deal with the devil and is therefore unlikely to last. 
THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM: PR OR MAJORITARIAN? 
Of the factors considered in this study, the type of electoral system a state institutes is 
arguably the most important. Electoral system design is a crucial variable in democratic stability 
because it provides the means by which political parties or minorities are either included in or 
excluded from government. Proportional representation (PR) electoral systems typically employ 
open or closed party lists or the use of a single transferable vote. In a study of several Sub­
Saharan states, Reynolds finds that those states using proportional representation were more 
successful and stable democracies.lo Lijphart (2004) notes that the type of electoral system is 
crucial because it is significantly related to the development of the party system, type of 
executive, and the relationship between the legislature and the executive.ll States using 
plurality methods are more likely to have a two-party system and a one party state with a more 
dominant executive. PR, on the other hand, is likely to be associated with a multi-party state, 
coalitions, and a more equal legislative-executive relationship. These characteristics define the 
consensus model of democracy that relies on separation, instead of concentration of power.12 
The former two characteristics are significant for the representation of a diverse number of 
groups in divided societies, while the later prevents an executive take over. Like Reynolds, 
Norris also finds that states making use of PR are more successful at democratic consolidation, 
as opposed to those using majority or plurality electoral rules.13 
However, proportional representation has several shortcomings, often cited by its critics. 
To begin with, the low voting thresholds that are characteristic in many proportional 
representation electoral systems give small minority group representatives little incentive to 
appeal to people outside their own ethnic group, while moderate political leaders may be 
branded as traitors for attempting to appeal to a wider base. Proportional representation also 
may serve to institutionalize and reinforce ethnic tensions in society by failing to provide 
political leaders with incentives for cross-group cooperation. As Lardeyret (1991) argues, PR 
systems are inherently more unstable since coalition governments cannot cope with serious 
disagreements. This leads to instability as the executive is left vacant and time is needed to 
construct a new coalition and government. These small minority parties tend to wield an undue 
amount of power as they are often the swing votes in coalitions.PR's tendency to allow even 
extremist parties into government is also problematic as they often are anti-state. Lardeyret's 
most important criticism is that PR is the worst system to adopt for ethnically divided states in 
Africa.14 Elections often degenerate into a competition between ethnic groups over public office 
10 Reynolds 2009. 11 Lijphart 2004. 
12 Lijphart 2006; 1999; Norris 2004. 
13 Norris 2008, 130. 
14 Lardeyret 1991. 
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and the best way to counteract this is to encourage members of each group to run against one 
another on trans-ethnic issues in single member districts. 
Majoritarian electoral systems, in contrast to PR, are characterized by the use of either a 
majority or plurality system. Majority systems usually employ a second ballot, while plurality 
systems typically use a first-past-the-post method and both types of systems also make use of 
single member districts (SMD). These majoritarian systems are thought to encourage bridging 
strategies and force political leaders to appeal to a wider base of voters. It is theorized that more 
moderate electoral appeals should therefore foster social tolerance and cooperation. Parties 
must combine the differing interests of as many voters as possible and offer their electors a 
coherent program that they will govern by. A moderation of parties also comes from this, as 
most of the votes parties receive are from undecided voters in the middle.15 As Barkan suggests, 
in agrarian societies - common in Sub-Saharan Africa - PR often does not produce electoral 
results that are much more inclusive than majoritarian systems with SMD.16 In addition, 
majoritarian systems make elected members directly responsible to constituent concerns and 
provide each district with a representative at the national level.17 Conversely, PR tends to 
weaken the links between voter and representative as each region has no definitive 
representative. This in turn reduces the prospects for long-term democratic consolidation.18 
Majoritarianism, like PR, has a number of shortcomings. Critics of majoritarian systems 
argue that winner-takes-all elections often fail to produce stability in post-conflict or divided 
societies19. According to Lijphart, in ethnically divided societies "majority rule spells majority 
dictatorship and civil strife rather than democracy."2o Majoritarian regimes often fail to 
incorporate minorities into the government and encourage excluded groups to resort to 
alternative methods to express their demands. These can range from violent protests to civil 
war, and even state failure. Majoritarian systems are also capable of producing vagaries, such as 
the exclusion of substantially supported third parties and a parliamentary majority being won 
with fewer total votes than the opposition. Established democracies may be able to tolerate such 
representational anomalies, but these could prove catastrophic for fledgling African 
democracies.21 
PRESIDENTS AND PARLIAMENTS 
The concept of a parliamentary executive, or using the legislature as a source for the 
executive, lends itself well to power-sharing and is advantageous for a number of reasons. The 
prime minister and cabinet can only continue to hold power so long as they have the support of 
the majority of the legislature. There is then a stronger incentive for the executive and 
15 Lardeyret 1991. 
16 Barkan 1995. 
17 Norris 2004. 
18 Barkan 1998. 
19 Binningsbo 2006. 
20 Norris 2008, 25. 
21 Reynolds 1995; 1999. 
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legislature to collaborate, which increases inter-electoral flexibility and acts as a safeguard 
against unpopular prime ministers.22 Prime ministers also tend to lead more collegial cabinets, 
as opposed to the hierarchical cabinets found in presidential systems. This creates more 
collective accountability, as the ministers must present a united agenda. Overall, parliamentary 
executives offer more forms of accountability and come closest to exemplifying power-sharing. 
Opposed to a parliamentary system, the decision to use a presidential system poses 
several risks. To begin with, both the president and the legislature have a rival source of power, 
the people, which can make it difficult to resolve deadlocks and disputes.23 The fixed term 
lengths of a presidential system are less flexible, whereas an unpopular prime minister can be 
much more easily removed from power and replaced without destabilizing the entire 
government. Presidential executives can also be a slippery slope for fledgling democracies in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, which have led to authoritarianism in the past.24 Additionally, presidential 
systems are more unstable and thus more susceptible to regime collapse, while the winner­
takes-all outcomes of presidential elections simultaneously raise the stakes and make it less 
likely that the loser will accept the outcome. To add to this, the combination of the roles of both 
the head of state and head of government reduces the checks and balances on the executive.25 
Presidential systems also lack in representativeness and legitimacy, both of which are crucial to 
democracy. 
Presidential systems are often criticized and seldom defended. However, Shugart and 
Carey offer four areas in which presidential systems are superior to parliamentary systems. 
These areas are accountability, identifiability, mutual checks, and an arbiter.26 Presidential 
systems are superior when it comes to the principle of maximizing direct accountability 
between voters and elected officials. Presidents, being directly elected by voters, cannot be 
removed due to shifting coalitions or unpopularity in the assembly. Voters can also more easily 
identify who they are voting for in a presidential race. Under parliamentary systems, especially 
those using PR, voting on party lists might be the only way voters can influence the executive. 
The mutual checks created by presidential systems also ensure that the executive can check the 
legislature and vice versa. In parliamentary systems the executive is not in a position to resist or 
check assembly initiative.27 Finally, the distance between the president and the assembly means 
the president cannot threaten the legislature by declaring a measure before the assembly a vote 
of confidence. Instead, a president can act as an arbiter or moderator of disputes to secure 
legislative agreement. 
22 Norris 2008, 141. 
23 Ibid., 132. 
24 Shugart and Carey 1992. 
25 Lijphart 2008. 
26 Shugart and Carey 1992. 
27 Ibid. 
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FEDERALISM AND DECENTRALIZATION 
The choice of electoral system and executive type influences the horizontal checks and 
balances of power in the central institutions of the state. On the other hand, decentralization 
determines vertical power-sharing among multiple layers of the government. Political, fiscal, 
and administrative decentralization are arguably constitutional solutions to help mitigate 
conflict, consolidate peace, and protect minority communities.28 Decentralized governance has 
several advantages. First, it generates more democratic participation, representation, and 
accountability. Democratically elected local and regional bodies give voters more opportunities 
to participate in the democratic process increasing the accountability and responsiveness of 
local officials. Next, fiscal decentralization reduces corruption by increasing the transparency 
and accountability of elected officials. This point should be noted in regards to Sub-Sahara 
Africa, as many of the states in the region are some of the most corrupt in the world. Another 
advantage is the strengthening of public policy by allowing local governments to create and 
implement region specific policies. This is an important point for Sub-Saharan states, as the 
large size and diversity of the groups and regions within these states likely leads to issues 
pertinent to only a particular constituency. The flexibility of decentralization is also typically 
associated with better administrative efficiency in regards to public services and regulations, as 
these are molded to fit each community. The advantages of decentralization are of great 
relevance to highly divided societies, such as those in Sub-Saharan Africa, because they can 
assist in accommodating multiple interests. While there are many different ways to achieve 
decentralization, a study conducted by Nicholas Charron found that accomodationist forms of 
vertical power-sharing, such as ethno-federalism, outperform integrationist forms of vertical 
power-sharing in heterogeneous societies, in regards to quality of government.29 This suggests 
that accommodating interests, as theories of power-sharing argue, is more successful. 
It is worth noting that with regards to plural societies, common in Sub-Sahara Africa 
and defined as states that contain multiple groups identified by ethnicity, religion, language, 
and a multitude of other characteristics, federalism and decentralization are important 
strategies for protecting the interests of spatially concentrated groups, especially if the 
administrative boundaries reflect the distribution of these groups. As Norris and Lijphart 
indicate, if the boundaries of sub-national governments are based on real social boundaries, the 
plural communities within these boundaries can become homogeneous within their region and 
thereby reduce communal violence and accommodate a multitude of interests within a single 
state.3° Even in plural societies where ethnic groups are dispersed, decentralization can be used 
to facilitate the representation of local minorities. Locally elected officials and local decision 
making can assist in managing conflict by including leaders drawn from minorities and manage 
sensitive cultural or educational matters. Decentralization as a means of power-sharing allows 
the diverse groups within plural societies to protect their rights and defend their interests. 
28 Norris 2008, 157. 
29 Charron 2009. 
30 Norris 2008, 162; Lijphart 1999. 
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While the case for decentralization is strong, critics often charge that decentralized 
governance is overly complex and leads to slow response times. By adding another layer of 
government bureaucracy, decentralization may increase costs, decrease efficiency, and result in 
poor services.31 The proponents of centralized governance argue centralization enhances 
integration, leads to more decisive action, and is more cost effective. The claim that 
decentralization increases representation and accountability has also met criticism. With 
numerous levels of government it may be unclear as to who to appeal to, and the 
responsibilities of representatives at different levels may overlap. The existence of multiple 
levels of government can also lead to the rise in regional parties, which in turn may fragment 
the party system at the national level. Decentralized governance also increases the possibility of 
clientelistic relationships forming between politicians and private citizens. Under such 
circumstances corruption may actually expand, not contract. The persistent conflict in Nigeria 
and Sudan indicates that federalism has had a less than perfect record in Africa. There are 
critics, as Norris indicates, that argue when multiethnic communities are intermingled, 
territorial autonomy is ineffective at managing conflict.32 The creation of sub-national structures 
may break up the state, while increased demands for autonomy may lead to conflict and even 
secession. In decentralized states where boundaries are drawn along ethnic lines it may lead to 
the rise in ethnically based parties or encourage politicians to use the I ethnic card' as a means of 
attracting votes. This reinforces ethnic identities, generates competition and conflict among 
groups, and destabilizes democratic institutions.33 Institutional arrangements that facilitate 
territorial autonomy may also provide ethnic leaders with access to the media and legislature 
where they can promote an agenda of intolerance and discrimination. 
TO SHARE OR NOT TO SHARE? 
Substantial evidence exists for both supporting or decrying power-sharing. Since power­
sharing draws on both electoral and federal institutions as well as a system's executive 
structure, it is unlikely that there will soon be a consensus on the effects of power-sharing. 
Either power-sharing institutions do as theorized or they are flawed, but this question must not 
be understudied. Previous studies have either drawn on a broader sample or an altogether 
different part of the world. With supporters of power-sharing designating it a source of 
democracy and peace, the obvious place it needs to be tested is where democracy and peace are 
often absent: Sub-Saharan Africa. With the preceding literature in mind and the focus on Sub­
Saharan Africa, this leads to two hypotheses. 
31 Prudhomme 1995. 
32 Norris 2008, 164. 
33 Mozaffar and Scarritt 1999. 
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These two hypotheses suggest that power-sharing institutions do provide more democracy and 
stability, and this study attempts to either support or disprove them. 
Hl: Greater degrees of institutional power-sharing will be associated with greater levels of democracy. 
H2: Greater degrees of institutional power-sharing will be associated with greater state instability. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Sub-Saharan African is a region where attempts at democratic rule have resulted in 
mixed success. The states within this region have implemented a variety of institutions, some 
with greater degrees of power-sharing than others. The wide variety of cases in Sub-Saharan 
Africa allows for the examination of levels of democracy and state stability from cases with 
relatively little or no power-sharing, to those states with relatively high levels of power-sharing. 
This study will use a most similar case design for the Sub-Saharan region. Using this design is 
intuitive because it will determine whether power-sharing can explain the increased presence of 
democracy and stability. Since the study is examining only Sub-Saharan Africa there are a 
number of variables that need to be controlled. These factors include low levels of development, 
recent transitions to democracy, ethno-linguistic heterogeneity, and former colonization. 
In order to study the effects of power-sharing in Sub-Saharan Africa, this study will 
examine all 48 states that comprise this region, according to the State Department's Bureau of 
African Affairs.34 The institutions and measures of democracy and stability will only be 
examined as to where they stand as of 2010. While studying the changes in democracy and 
stability over a period of time would be insightful, this study does not attempt to accomplish 
this due to the relatively fluid and dynamic nature of political institutions in Africa. 
Determining a time frame in which a majority of the Sub-Saharan states' political institutions 
remained stable would be near impossible. To assess the relationship between the variables, a 
bivariate analysis will be used to determine correlation between three variables: Power-Sharing 
Index Score, Freedom House Score, and Failed States Index Score. 
The four sub-regions of Sub-Saharan Africa - Eastern, Central, Western, and Southern­
will also be included as control variables. The regions are defined using the UN's definitions of 
regions with three exceptions. First, Sudan is considered part of Sub-Saharan Africa, yet under 
the UN's classification is part of Northern Africa. For this study Sudan is grouped with Eastern 
Africa because of its location and proximity to other East African states. The next two 
exceptions are Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Both of these states are defined as being part of 
Eastern Africa. However, upon further review and consultation these states were included as 
part of Southern Africa. This is due to their geographic location and because without these two 
cases Southern Africa would have been comprised of a mere five states. 
34 See appendix for full list of states and their scores. 
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INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 
The independent variable in this study is institutional power-sharing. It is measured by the 
extent to which the formal institutions of a country allow for the inclusion of all major political 
actors in the decision making process. In determining the levels of institutional power-sharing, I 
will look at the three major institutions related to power-sharing: the electoral system, type of 
executive, and state decentralization. Decentralization in this study refers to political, 
administrative, and fiscal decentralization. These three institutions are the most critical to 
power-sharing and ensuring the consolidation of democracy. 
Those states that use PR, a parliamentary executive, and federalism have higher levels of 
power-sharing. States that utilize a majoritarian electoral system, presidential executive, and are 
highly centralized constitute systems, that according to the literature, allow for very little 
power-sharing. To quantify levels of power-sharing I have developed a 10 point index ranging 
from 0-9 that rates countries levels of power-sharing based on the aforementioned factors of 
electoral system type, executive type, and degree of decentralization. All three factors will be 
based on a 4-point scale, from 0-3, with higher scores indicating more power-sharing. 
For the electoral system the scale goes as follows: Proportional representation = 3pts; 
Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) = 2pts; SMD or Plurality = 1 pt; appointed legislature or 
non-existence of the national legislature = Opts. For the electoral system variable, only the type 
of electoral system used for the lower house is considered in this index. The use of PR is 
associated with higher levels of power-sharing due to the low barriers it presents to parties 
trying to gain representation in the legislature. Such low barriers allow a multitude of parties to 
attain seats in the national legislature. MMP is a compromise in that it is neither PR nor 
majoritarian, but represents a middle ground between the two. While not as inclusive as PR, it 
is a step above majoritarian systems in terms of power-sharing. The problem with MMP is that 
often the threshold for the PR part of the system is as high as 5% or more. This means that 
groups dispersed throughout the country may not be able to attain representation. Majoritarian 
systems using SMD are seen as the least conducive to power-sharing as it is often much more 
difficult for minor parties to gain representation. The United States and United Kingdom are 
commonly cited examples of how such systems often lead to either a two party state or a one 
party system. There are cases in which the national legislature is either wholly appointed or 
non-existent. As this runs contrary to the purpose of power-sharing, which is to promote 
democracy, such institutions are regarded as allowing no degree of power-sharing. 
The next institution considered is the executive branch, coded as follows: Parliamentary 
system= 3pts; Semi-Presidential= 2pts; Presidential= lpt; appointed executive or monarchy 
=Opts. A parliamentary executive is associated with higher levels of power-sharing because the 
executive is often drawn from a coalition of parties that make up the majority in the lower 
house. Parliamentary systems also allow for the changing of the executive in a much more 
stable manner without the need for another national election. Systems that divide executive 
power, typically between a president and prime minister, are referred to as semi-presidential. 
While such systems do allow for the election of a prime minister and president these two 
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officials typically come from the same party. Semi-presidentialism can also be dangerous if the 
prime minister and president are from different political parties as this can result in executive 
deadlock and competition for power. Established democracies like France might be able to 
survive these situations, but in less stable states this could be a catalyst for conflict. Presidential 
systems invest all executive power into a single person and in addition to being less 
representative, elections to this position can be seen as a zero-sum game in highly divided 
societies. This gives the losing parties less incentive to accept defeat, as recent elections in 
Zimbabwe and Cote d'Ivoire have shown. The appointment of the executive, such as by an 
occupying force, or a monarchy like Swaziland represent an executive in which no power­
sharing can take place as the institution is utterly undemocratic. It should be noted that in this 
index those countries that have a president and prime minister are only considered semi­
presidential or parliamentary if the prime minister is chosen from the lower house or directly 
elected. If the president appoints the prime minister as part of his cabinet the system is 
considered presidential because the president is still effectively considered the head of state and 
head of government. 
The final factor, decentralization, can be broken down into three categories and goes as 
follows: Federations = 3pts; Decentralized Unions = 2pts; Unitary States = 1pt. 35 States with no 
central government or little to no control over territory =Opts. Federal institutions create another 
level of democratic representation in which minor or local parties can gain representation. This 
additional level of government also grants a degree of autonomy to these locales and allows 
them manage local affairs. Decentralized hybrids, similar to Tanzania, have devolved powers 
down to local levels of government and represent a step in the right direction in terms of 
power-sharing. However in these systems nearly all important decision making and real power 
still rests with the central government, especially in fiscal matters. A majority of Sub-Saharan 
states represent a highly centralized unitary structure. Under such systems, there is little, if any, 
devolution of power and nearly all decisions come from the central authority. If a state is failed, 
like Somalia, any form of devolution of powers is impossible. The state cannot even consider 
local or regional issues, let alone address them. With no place for representation from the local 
to national level, it is impossible for groups to share power.36 
Not all states will fit perfectly within these definitions. Even two states that are 
presidential republics may have nuanced differences that set them apart. Levels of 
centralization and electoral systems can be especially complicated. States are often simply 
identified as federal or unitary.37 For others though decentralization may be viewed as much 
more subtle process that involves incremental steps.38 The study of electoral systems usually 
involves identifying the rules of the system in place. For example, it is often important to 
distinguish between open and closed list PR. The inability of the index to include such detail is 
a limitation. However, nearly all state institutions can be classified under one of the three sub-
35 Norris 2008, 173. 
36 See Appendix for Power-sharing Index (PSI) Table. 
3? Lijphart 1999. 
38 Norris 2008, 170. 
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categories. The index considers the most relevant institutions and system types, which allows it 
to accurately rank states based on their levels of institutional power-sharing. 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
The first dependent variable is democracy. Democracy will be measured using the 
composite score of a country on the Freedom House Liberal Democracy Index. Freedom House 
uses the Gastil Index, a 7-point scale for measuring political rights and civil liberties. While 
other measures of democracy were considered, Freedom House was the only one with scores 
for the year 2010. Changes in a states' ranking are also explained along with any relevant 
political changes that took place. The index also does not favor any particular type of 
democratic institution. In other words, by default it does not consider a parliamentary executive 
any more democratic than a presidential executive. 
Freedom House, an independent think tank based in the United States began assessing 
political trends in the 1950s. In 1972 it switched to the Gastil Index which assigns ratings of the 
political rights and civil liberties for each state and then categorizes them as free, partially free, 
or not free. The index tracks the existence of political rights by looking at the electoral processes, 
political pluralism, and the functioning of government. Civil liberties are measured in terms of 
the existence of freedom of speech and association, rule of law, and personal rights. The 
classifications are based on a checklist of questions, which includes ten separate items that relate 
to the existence of political rights and fifteen items concerning civil liberties. These items assess 
the institutional checks and balances of power on the executive by the legislature, an 
independent judiciary, and the existence of political rights and civil liberties. These also include 
self-determination and participation by minorities, and free and fair elections laws. Each item is 
given a score from 0-4 and all are equal when combined. The raw scores of a country are then 
converted into a 7-point scale of political rights and a 7-point scale of civil liberties. These two 
scores are then combined to determine the average rating of a state and whether it is free, partly 
free, or not free.39 
Although it provides scores for nearly all states and independent territories as well as 
being a long running time-series of observations, there are several flaws and biases. First the 
process used by Freedom House suffers from lack of transparency, so it is impossible to check 
the reliability and consistency of coding decisions. The items used to measure political rights 
and civil liberties also cover a wide range of issues, some of which might not necessarily be 
indicative of democracy. Since no breakdown of the composite scores is made available it is 
impossible to test which of the items correlate most with democracy. While it is biased in the 
sense that it measures only liberal democracy, it is widely used and trusted as providing an 
accurate representation of a states' level of democracy.4o 
The second dependent variable is state stability. To measure this I utilized the Failed 
States Index from ForeignPolicy.com and the Fund for Peace. The Failed State Index defines a 
39 Freedom House. 
40 Norris 2008; Munck and Verkuilen 2002; See Appendix for Freedom House Scores. 
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state as failing when it loses physical control over its territory or a monopoly on the legitimate 
use of force. The erosion of legitimate authority, inability to provide public services, and 
inability interact with other states are also characteristics. The index includes 177 states and the 
Fund for Peace uses the Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST), an original methodology 
developed over the past decade. The CAST model employs a four step trend-line analysis, (1) 
consisting of rating twelve social, economic, political, and military indicators; (2) assessing the 
capabilities of five core state institutions considered essential for sustaining security; (3) 
identifying idiosyncratic variables or factors; and (4) placing countries on a conflict map that 
shows the conflict history of the states being analyzed. The twelve indicators used are: 
Demographic Pressures, Refugees/IDPs, Group Grievance, Human Flight, Uneven 
Development, Economic Decline, Delegitimization of the State, Public Services, Human Rights, 
Security Apparatus, Factionalized Elites, and External Intervention.41 
The ranking a state receives is based on the total combined scores of these twelve 
indicators. Each indicator is measured on a scale from 0-10, with zero being the most stable and 
ten being the most unstable. These indicators are then combined to form a scale from 0-120 in 
which higher scores indicate more instability. The CAST methodology has been peer-reviewed 
over the past decade by independent scholars, educational, government, and private 
institutions (Fund for Peace). Since the ratings are meant to measure the vulnerability of a state 
they cannot predict when a state might collapse or experience violence. Although the trend lines 
that these scores produce may be used as a means of determining the future direction of a state. 
Unfortunately the raw data used in creating these rankings is not readily available due to it 
being drawn from millions of news articles and reports. However the index values are readily 
available to the public.42 
REGION 
Region is factored in due to the potential effects it may have on stability and democracy. 
As has happened before in Africa, a result of civil war is often human flight. A massive influx of 
refugees can place a great strain on the recipient country. The violence that drove these refugees 
might not only follow them, but their sudden presence in a foreign state has the possibility of 
inciting a xenophobic backlash among the native population. Another dangerous possibility is 
the chance rebel groups may use neighboring states as a launching point for attacks. Regional 
conflict has the potential to destabilize all surrounding states and maintaining stability is 
undoubtedly easier if neighboring states are not imploding due to civil war. Region is also 
important when considering democracy because of the idea of regional diffusion. In other 
words, democracy in one state has the potential to influence and spread to surrounding states. 
The ideas and institutions adopted by one state can impact those of another. If all states within a 
particular region had adopted democratic institutions, while states outside of this region had 
failed to do so, one could conclude that regional factors played a role in spreading democracy. 
41 Foreign Policy. 
42 See Appendix for Failed States Index Scores. 
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DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
As the data test the two competing bodies of literature on power-sharing institutions 
and the possible effects of region, there are several expected outcomes. If the data support the 
hypotheses that those states with higher levels of institutional power-sharing have higher levels 
of democracy and stability, then there should be a positive correlation between the Power­
Sharing Index Score (PSI) and Freedom House Score (FH). There should also be a negative 
relationship between the PSI Score and Failed States Index Score (FSI). If the data do not 
support the hypotheses, the opposite will be seen in the results. A third outcome in this case is 
possible. The results may support none of the stated hypotheses and there simply might not be 
a significant relationship in either direction. This would truly be disappointing as it would 
imply that no set of institutions is likely to be any more effective in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
If region does have any significant affect on democracy and stability we should see this 
in the form of significant positive correlations between the individual regions and FH Scores 
and FSI Scores. The absence of such significant correlations means we can rule out region as 
have any meaningful impact on a state's measured level of democracy or stability. However, the 
presence of any significant findings would indicate that there are regional factors that are 
influencing how stable and democratic a state is. The number of cases used in this study, 48, 
while relatively large for a comparative study, also means each individual case can have a 
larger effect on the overall results. While this small number may justify the use of a ninety 
percent confidence level, statistical significance will only be given to results achieving a ninety­
five percent confidence leveL 
Table 1 shows the results of the bivariate correlation between the FSI Score, PSI Score, 
FH Score, and region. The first notable result can be seen in the strength and significance of the 
correlation between democracy and stability. While this association may seem obvious, it 
indicates that these two characteristics are not simply two random and unrelated concepts. 
Instead, it points to the fact that these are two characteristics of a state that are strongly 
associated with each other. Since power-sharing institutions are theorized to improve these two 
aspects of a state, it is crucial they actually be related. The next significant result is the strong 
correlation between institutional power-sharing and democracy. This indicates that those states 
with higher levels of institutional power-sharing also have correspondingly higher levels of 
democracy. This supports the hypothesis that a higher level of institutional power-sharing is 
associated with more democracy. The correlation between power-sharing and stability also 
turns out to be significant at the ninety-five percent level of confidence and moderately strong. 
The negative correlation is expected here as it shows that higher levels of power-sharing 
correlate negatively with instability. This supports the second hypothesis that higher levels of 
institutional power-sharing will be associated with more stability. As we see with these results, 
region has no significant relationship to either of the dependent variables. Thus the findings 
exclude region as being strongly associated with stability or democratization. 
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Table 1: Correlation between power-sharing (PSI), stability (FSI), democracy (FH) and Region 
Dependent Variables: FSI Score and FH Score 
FH Score FSI Score PSI Score Eastern Western Central 
FH Score 
FSI Score .703** 
(.000) 
PSI Score .455** -.318* 
(.001) (.028) 
Eastern -.114 .028 -.233 
(.438) (.852) (.111) 
Western .167 -.011 .117 .574** 
(.257) (.939) (.427) (.000) 
Central -.255 .181 -.090 .316* .331* 
(.080) (.218) (.545) (.029) (.021) 
Southern .196 -.213 .247 .292* .306* .185 
(.182) (.147) (.091) (.044) (.034) (.209) 
N 48 48 48 48 48 48 
**p<O.Ol, *p<0.05 
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The other significant findings reveal that the regions correlate with each other, in all but 
one instance, because they all share the similar characteristics of high instability and lower 
levels of democracy. The one instance in which the regions do not correlate with each other is in 
the case of Central and Southern Africa. This is most likely because Southern Africa is arguably 
the most stable and democratic region of Sub-Saharan Africa, while Central Africa is the worst 
in these regards. 43 
CONCLUSIONS 
Theories of power-sharing suggest that institutions that allow for the inclusion of all 
major actors will produce more democracy and greater stability. These consociational systems 
have been studied extensively over the past several decades by scholars such as Norris and 
43 If Zimbabwe and Mozambique are grouped in with Eastern Africa the results of the correlation differ greatly for 
Southern Africa and alter the conclusions that can be drawn. When this is done, Southern Africa has a correlation 
with stability of -.319 that is significant at the ninety-five percent level of confidence. This is almost exactly the same 
strength of the correlation between power-sharing and stability. This indicates that the stability of a region plays a 
role in state stability. The relationship between democracy and Southern Africa also improves to .261 with a 
significance of .073. The correlation with power-sharing also increases to .277 with a significance of .056. What these 
alternate results point towards is that Southern Africa has adopted institutions with more power-sharing. In doing so 
the result has been higher levels of democracy and stability. 
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Lipjhart, producing a debate about their effects. This study has attempted to contribute to that 
debate by testing the relationship between higher levels of institutional power-sharing and 
democracy and conflict in the tumultuous region of Sub-Saharan Africa. The results show that 
those states with higher levels of institutional power-sharing are associated with greater 
democracy and stability. While these findings by no means conclude the debate, the results 
clearly support proponents of power-sharing. There has been very little work done to study the 
effects of power-sharing institutions of Sub-Saharan Africa. The theoretical literature predicts 
two sets of competing hypotheses on the expected outcomes of increased power-sharing. 
However, previous studies have not focused on the part of the world where these institutions 
may be needed most. This study takes the first step in determining whether or not power­
sharing institutions do work Sub-Saharan Africa. 
With many African states deeply divided and under duress, studies of this kind can 
assist policymakers in determining the correct institutions to implement. Looking to cases to 
like South Africa, Cape Verde, and Sao Tome and Principe, other states can see how power­
sharing institutions have assisted in creating free and stable states. This study should not be 
viewed as the final word on power-sharing institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa. Examples exist 
within Sub-Saharan Africa, such as Ethiopia and Niger, where states have moved to institutions 
allowing for greater degrees of power-sharing and yet their levels of democracy and stability 
remain dangerously low. It is important for scholars to continue studying the precise reasons as 
to why power-sharing has been more effective in some states than others. 
The aforementioned cases of failure point towards factors affecting power-sharing not 
covered in this study. It is possible that corruption or lack of funds has prevented such 
institutions from functioning as they are theoretically designed to function. The literature also 
makes an important distinction between those states that are highly divided or post-conflict. 
This difference is important because past conflict can make it more difficult to bring all major 
actors to the table, while cleaved societies may simply be seeking a means of fairer 
representation. Deeply divided societies with a high degree of ethno-linguistic fractionalization 
may also affect the duration of such institutions as the possibility of conflict can be greater. As 
mentioned in the design section of this study, institutional duration was something that 
unfortunately had to be omitted for logistical reasons. However, examining the duration of 
power-sharing institutions would go far in disproving the critics that power-sharing institutions 
do not last, or vindicate their theories about the fragility of such institutions. 
The purpose of this study was not to try and account for every possible factor 
influencing the success or failure of power-sharing in Sub-Saharan Africa. Instead, it was meant 
to act as a starting point for future research. To gain a better perspective on what conditions are 
conducive to the success of these institutions and what may lead to their failure requires a more 
in depth look into the regions and individual cases. In doing so it can also be more fully 
understood how power-sharing institutions affect regime change and the formation of political 
parties. With that being said it is critical that we determine which set of institutions are most 
likely to provide democracy and stability for the states of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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Appendix 
List of Sub-Saharan States, Scores, System Type, and Region 
Country FH Score FSI Score PSI Score Electoral Executive Decentralization Region 
Svstem 
Angola 5.5 83.7 5 PR Pres. Unitary Central 
Benin 2 76.8 3 Maj. Pres. Unitary Western 
Botswana 2.5 68.6 5 Maj. Par. Unitary Southern 
Burkina Faso 4 90.7 6 PR Semi Unitary Western 
Burundi 4.5 96.7 5 PR Pres Unitary Eastern 
Cameroon 6 95.4 5 Maj. Semi Decentralized Central 
Cape Verde 1 77.2 7 PR Par. Unitary Western 
CAR 5 106.4 3 Maj. Pres. Unitary Central 
Chad 6.5 113.3 3 Maj. Pres. Unitary Central 
Comoros 3.5 85.1 5 Maj. Pres. Federal Eastern 
DRC 6 109.9 4 MMP Pres. Unitary Central 
RofC 5.5 92.5 3 Maj. Pres. Unitary Central 
Cote d'Ivoire 5.5 101.2 4 Maj. Semi Unitary Western 
Djibouti 5 81.9 4 Maj. Semi Unitary Eastern 
Equatorial 7 88.5 5 PR Pres. Unitary Western 
Guinea 
Eritrea 7 93.3 3 Maj. Pres. Unitary Eastern 
Ethiopia 5 98.8 7 Maj. Par. Federal Eastern 
Gabon 5.5 75.3 3 Maj. Pres. Unitary Central 
Gambia 5 80.2 3 Maj. Pres. Unitary Western 
Ghana 1.5 67.1 4 Maj. Pres. Decentralized Western 
TTninn 
Guinea 6.5 105 4 MMP Pres. Unitary Western 
Guinea-Bissau 4 97.2 6 PR Semi Unitary Western 
Kenya 4 100.7 3 Maj. Pres. Unitary Eastern 
Lesotho 3 82.2 6 MMP Par. Unitary Southern 
Liberia 3.5 91.7 3 Maj. Pres. Unitary Western 
Madagascar 5 82.6 4 Maj. Semi Unitary Eastern 
Malawi 3.5 93.6 3 Maj. Pres. Unitary Eastern 
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Country FH Score FSI Score PSI Score Electoral Executive Decentralization Region 
System 
Mali 2.5 79.3 4 Maj. Semi Unitary Western 
Mauritania 5.5 89.1 4 Maj. Semi Unitary Western 
Mauritius 2 44.4 5 Maj. Par. Unitary Eastern 
Mozambique 3.5 81.7 5 PR Pres. Unitary Eastern 
Namibia 2 74.5 6 PR Pres. Decentralized Southern 
TTnion 
Niger 4.5 97.8 6 PR Semi Unitary Western 
Nigeria 4.5 100.2 5 Maj. Pres. Federal Western 
Rwanda 5.5 88.7 5 PR Pres. Unitary Eastern 
Sao Tome & 2 75.8 7 PR Par. Unitary Central 
Principe 
Senegal 3 74.6 5 MMP Semi Unitary Western 
Seychelles 3 67.9 4 MMP Pres. Unitary Eastern 
Sierra Leone 3 93.6 5 PR Pres. Unitary Western 
Somalia 7 114.3 0 N/A N/A N/A Eastern 
South Africa 2 67.9 9 PR Par. Federal Southern 
Sudan 7 111.8 4 N/A Pres. Federal Eastern 
Swaziland 6 82.8 2 Maj. N/A Unitary Southern 
Tanzania 3.5 81.2 4 Maj. Pres. Decentralized Eastern 
Bnion 
Togo 4.5 88.1 5 PR Pres. Unitary Western 
Uganda 4.5 97.5 3 Maj. Pres. Unitary Eastern 
Zambia 3.5 83.9 3 Maj. Pres. Unitary Eastern 
Zimbabwe 6 110.2 4 Maj. Semi Unitary Eastern 
Sub-Saharan States, Freedom House Scores, Failed States Index Scores, System Types, and Region. 
Source(s); State Department Bureau of African Affairs; Freedom House 2010; Failed States Index 2010; 
CIA World Factbook; UN Definition of Regions; Political Handbook of Africa: 2007. www.state.gov; 
www.freedomhouse.org; www.foreignpolicy.com; www.cia.gov; www.un.org. 
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Power-sharing Index Table (PSI) 
Score Electoral System Executive Decentralization 
3 Proportional Parliamentary Federal 
Representation 
2 Mixed Member Semi-Presidential Decentralized Union 
Proportional 
1 Majoritarian Presidential Unitary 
(Plurality /FPTP w / 
SMD) 
0 Appointed or non- Monarchy or Appointed Failed State 
existent 
Power-sharing Index (PSI) . Source(s) : CIA World Factbook; Political Handbook of Africa: 2007. 
www.cia.gov. 
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